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Abstract
Th e values of aggregative democracy have dominated much of civic education as its values refl ect the 
realities of the American political system. We argue that deliberative democratic theory better 
addresses the moral and epistemological demands of democracy when compared to aggregative 
democracy. It better attends to protecting citizens’ autonomy to participate in civic life and is able to 
accommodate the diverse experiences and viewpoints of the American public. We conclude by exam-
ining how deliberative democracy provides a new lens on civic education practices. It calls for atten-
tion to be given to the process of the exchange of reasons among students and also allows students to 
critically examine the current democratic process to determine in what ways it is or is not living up to 
deliberative democratic ideals.
Questions concerning education for autonomy, education for democracy, and the 
relationship between these two have been much 
examined by philosophers. Less examined, however, is how 
answers to these questions play out, or ought to, in classrooms and 
schools under the rubric of civics education. For the most part, 
civics education has implicitly been driven by a liberal conception 
of citizenship: developing in students an understanding of the 
rights (and duties, in some conceptions) of citizenship that are 
necessary to ensure that the individual has a wide latitude to 
determine what constitutes the good life and pursue that life. Th e 
prevailing view has been that civics education should remain 
neutral with respect to alternative conceptions of the good life, at 
least those suffi  ciently “non- controversial” (Gutmann, 1999).
In this article, we explicate two prominent conceptions of 
democracy and their associated conceptions of autonomy, both 
encompassed by the broad liberal conception of citizenship just 
described, and then illustrate how their diff erences underwrite 
diff erent approaches to civics education.1 In particular, we compare 
an aggregative view of democracy with a deliberative democratic 
view. We provide several reasons why deliberative democracy is the 
better of the two conceptions and, accordingly, creates a better 
foundation on which to build civics education. We then elaborate 
the approach to civics education this conception supports.2
The Superiority of Deliberative Democratic Theory
Contemporary democratic theory rests on two fundamental 
premises, one moral and one epistemic. Morally, human beings 
should be respected as autonomous agents, enabled to live life 
“from the inside” (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 13; also see Gutmann, 1999, 
particularly Chapter 1; Callen, 1997; Brighouse, 2000; Galston, 
1995). Epistemically, social life is marked by uncertainty and vastly 
varied experiences such that disagreement, including moral 
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disagreement, between groups and individuals is one of its 
permanent features. Th us, communal decisions that bind all 
members of the community despite their diff erences are best 
justifi ed in terms of procedures that accommodate both of these 
moral and epistemic features.
Democracy involves both a negative and a positive obligation 
to respect autonomy. On the negative side, associated with political 
liberty, people should be impeded as little as possible in achieving a 
life made of their free choices. On the positive side, associated with 
political equality, people should be provided with meaningful 
opportunities to develop and exercise their autonomy. Proponents 
of an aggregative view of democracy diverge from those with a 
deliberative view on how to fl esh out the general commitment to 
autonomy in a democracy, particularly regarding how closely we 
should identify autonomy with the capacity to participate eff ec-
tively in democratic forums.
Deliberative democratic theory pays special attention to the 
social context within which people live autonomous lives. 
Although autonomy is a concept associated with the individual, it 
is lived out in various communities, including the political 
community. Th e idea of autonomy leads deliberative democrats to 
focus on two important ideals. Th e fi rst is mutual respect 
(Gutmann, 1999). By asking people to engage in deliberations with 
others, deliberative democracy requires participants to acknowl-
edge the autonomy of others and the accompanying right to hold 
moral positions on public issues that may diff er from their own. 
Th e second ideal associated with autonomy in deliberative 
democracy is that democratic forums should promote inclusive 
and fair participation. Th erefore, deliberative democracy asks 
participants to consider the question of the degree to which 
democratic forums and democratic society accommodate inclu-
sive and fair participation.
Deliberative democracy requires participants to respect one 
another’s autonomy by engaging in good- faith critical dialogue 
that includes a willingness to revise their initially preferred 
policies and practices as a result of deliberation. Th e matters about 
which people deliberate have cognitive epistemic status because 
deliberative democracy asks citizens to provide evidence and 
arguments to support their positions within a deliberation, and 
that reasoning supports the goal of the entire process, which is to 
reach conclusions that are the most warranted and should thus be 
accepted as reasonable (though not necessarily correct) by all 
concerned. In deliberative theory, the moral value of autonomy is 
grounded in democracy in that it is the accepted autonomy of each 
citizen that calls upon everyone to value and respect the moral 
opinions of others by engaging in deliberation with them. 
Democratic procedures are constrained in democracy’s own name 
by being grounded in the requirement of fair and inclusive 
conditions of participation.
Th e deliberative conception of democratic decision making 
diff ers signifi cantly from the conception associated with aggrega-
tive democracy (e.g., Gutmann & Th ompson, 2004). Democratic 
decision making consists of tallying citizens’ preferences to 
produce collective decisions, typically by voting. (Chambers, 2003, 
for instance, referred to the aggregative view as “voting- centric.”) 
Generally speaking, the aggregative conception gives little atten-
tion to the communicative process by which democratic decision 
making should proceed. In its philosophical forms, the moral value 
of autonomy identifi es what it is for humans to live well and is 
independent of its role in democracy. Democratic procedures are 
constrained in the interest of protecting autonomy. Epistemically, 
the cognitive status of the objects of democratic decision making 
need not diff er from deliberative theory, but the epistemic process 
through which democratic decisions are reached does.
In its nonphilosophical forms, which better capture how 
democratic decision making actually occurs in the United States, 
the aggregative conception sees democratic decision making as 
strategic rather than deliberative; it is a process whereby individuals 
and groups attempt to win assent to their previously settled views 
(preferences) using whatever rhetorical strategies prove eff ective, 
including advertising, sound bites, issue framing, and so on. No 
moral obligation to respect others’ autonomy exists beyond what 
the formal rules and regulations of a modus vivendi require. 
Epistemically, this form of aggregative democracy tends toward an 
“emotive” conception of democratic decision making (House & 
Howe, 1999). Th e idea of subjecting initial preferences to reasoned 
evaluation and being open to revising them if justifi ed is precluded 
on epistemic grounds; for preferences are underpinned by values, 
and values are not the kind of things for which people can provide 
reasoned justifi cation or criticism.
What we are calling the philosophical and nonphilosophical 
forms of the aggregative conception of democracy diff er in both 
their moral and their epistemic premises (which are related). 
Nonetheless, because each seriously neglects the moral evaluation 
of communicative processes that underlie democratic decisions, 
each is subject to two general criticisms that the deliberative 
conception of democracy is designed to avoid. First, basing 
decisions on the outcome of aggregated preferences while holding 
these largely immune from criticism and revision serves to 
entrench preexisting unjust distributions of goods such as income, 
education, health care, and employment, as well as to stunt 
eff ectiveness in the democratic process (Gutmann & Th ompson, 
2004). Second, such unjust distributions preclude the possibility of 
“eff ective participation” in the democratic process on the part of 
many citizens. Eff ective participation on the part of the citizenry is 
a prerequisite of a robust democracy, which by defi nition enables 
its citizens to live life autonomously through and as a consequence 
of their participation in “conscious social reproduction” 
(Gutmann, 1999).
In our view, the deliberative conception of democracy is 
superior to the aggregative conception on the basis of the consider-
ations just adduced. A thoroughgoing defense of this view would 
require much more than the sketch we have provided, but that it is 
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we now consider how 
certain aspects of civics education might change for the better when 
considered through the lens of deliberative democratic theory.
Imagining Deliberative Civics Education
Taking deliberative democratic theory seriously when considering 
civics education allows us to reframe certain practices already 
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prevalent in civics education and provides new perspectives on 
their importance. We fi rst consider the way that deliberative 
democracy’s approach to the moral premise of democracy aff ects 
the civics classroom. We do this by examining the role of moral 
controversies in civics education and the practices surrounding 
holding and espousing one’s own moral viewpoints on political 
issues. We then discuss how autonomy viewed through the lens of 
deliberative democracy leads to mutual respect within a citizenry 
(and classroom) and critical examination of the existing demo-
cratic system, the practices that accompany it, and the context in 
which it functions.
Deliberative Civics Education 
and Controversial Issues
Deliberative democracy addresses the epistemic issues of democ-
racy by recognizing and bringing into the public sphere the moral 
and social diff erences that exist within society. Because of this, it is 
important to deliberative civics education that teachers make moral 
controversies a key aspect. We agree with Gutmann (1999) and 
others who argue that it is impossible to avoid moral content in 
education and, even if it were possible, such an education would be 
undesirable.
We acknowledge that incorporating moral controversy in the 
civics classroom may not be an easy or comfortable task for 
teachers, but it is important. Civics teachers should consider their 
district’s policy about teaching controversial or sensitive issues in 
the classroom. Th e variation of policies and the wording of such 
policies illustrate varying levels of receptivity within schools 
districts, and some of these may need revision to permit delibera-
tive civics education. Consider the following excerpt from the 
policy of our large local districts:
Administrators and teachers shall admit controversial issues to the 
school program only when the problems are obviously real and 
understandable to the students and when they are relevant to the 
established curriculum for the grade and subject of the class. (Denver 
Public Schools, 2011)
Th e wording of this policy, which allows admittance of controver-
sial issues only in certain instances, is likely to give teachers pause 
when they are considering discussing controversial issues in the 
civics classroom. While the curriculum may be written in a way 
that makes controversial issues relevant for use in the classroom,3 
the policy is written in such a way that that option is prevented. For 
purposes of comparison, consider this policy, from a school district 
near the one mentioned above:
Controversy arising from such diff erences [in underlying values, 
beliefs, and interests] is inherent in a pluralistic society. An important 
function of public education is to provide students with an 
understanding of how controversial issues are dealt with in a 
democracy. Th is includes the opportunity to learn about the issues, 
problems, and concerns of contemporary society, to form opinions, and 
to participate in discussion of these issues and expression of opinion in 
the classroom. (Jeff co Public Schools, 2011)
Th is policy is more refl ective of how deliberative democracy 
views the epistemic premise of democracy. It acknowledges a 
pluralistic society and the role of schools in addressing pluralism. 
Although other aspects of this policy are similar to the previous 
one, this wording invites teachers to bring controversial issues 
into the classroom.
Of course, bringing controversial issues into the classroom is 
not a new notion (see Hess, 2009). However, when looking at the 
practice through the lens of deliberative democracy, we can see new 
purposes in bringing controversial issues into the civics classroom. 
For example, the Civic Mission of Schools Report (Carnegie 
Corporation of New York & CIRCLE, 2003) advocates for the 
discussion of controversial issues in the classroom because it is 
likely to lead to “greater interest in politics, improved critical 
thinking and communications skills, more civic knowledge, and 
more interest in discussing public aff airs out of school” (p. 6). 
While all of these are laudable, terms like civic knowledge and 
critical thinking and communication skills tend to be murky. Seeing 
deliberation as part of education allows us to better understand 
what should emerge from discussion of controversial issues in the 
classroom. Th e following portions of the paper examine the 
practice of deliberation to identify what civic knowledge and skills 
might be developed by deliberative civics education.
The Deliberative Process in Civics Education 
and the Development of Deliberative Skills
Before entering into deliberation in the classroom, students should 
be prompted to come to a reasoned understanding of their own 
moral convictions about controversial issues as part of understand-
ing how deliberation addresses the epistemic premise of democ-
racy. Students may enter the classroom with a variety of 
experiences and degrees of familiarity with respect to the contro-
versial issue. For some students, the issue will be familiar and they 
will have engaged with it in various ways outside class, whether 
through discussions within family or other social institutions. 
Other students may not have given serious thought to the issue 
because they felt no need to address it. Deliberative civics education 
values the engagement of the fi rst group and encourages those 
students to continue the process of thinking through their own 
perspective. For the second group, deliberative civics education 
should prompt the students to consider the issue. Such students 
likely have some position on the issue, even if it is not yet well 
developed. Deliberative democracy asks students to identify the 
reasons for that position, even if the sole reason at the start of the 
deliberation is simply that it is what their parents have said about 
the issue. Only by identifying their own reasons for a position on an 
issue can students engage in deliberation. Morals and values may 
lie at the heart of deliberation, and this process helps students come 
to understand that these are at the same time reasoned positions 
and can be discussed.
Th is may appear to limit deliberation in ways that disadvan-
tage those who hold beliefs that are not supported by others as 
legitimate. Hess (2009) illustrated this when she noted that some 
teachers do not teach a controversial issue because they deny that 
controversy exists. A teacher may clearly see a correct side to the 
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controversy, and therefore may choose not to bring the issue into 
the classroom for deliberation, as she would rather teach her 
understanding of the “correct” position on the issue. In this 
situation, and in light of deliberative democracy, both teachers and 
students can develop an understanding of their own reasoning and 
what it means to have reasons.
Talisse (2009), in a defense of his version of deliberative 
democracy, described a universally shared folk epistemology that 
undergirds deliberation. Reasonable people share certain charac-
teristics with respect to the ideas of truth and knowledge, or at least 
how we treat them in everyday living, without committing to any 
particular and more precise epistemological framework. If we 
believe that such a folk epistemology is accurate, we also have both 
an understanding of what it means to hold a reasoned belief and a 
rationale for attempting to understand the reasoning behind our 
own moral convictions as well as the convictions of others.
As the fi rst tenet of folk epistemology, Talisse said that all 
people would agree that “to believe some proposition, p, is to hold 
that p is true” (p. 87). In other words, we would all consider it odd 
to say that we believe p, but we do not believe that p is true. His 
point is that we assume a person who believes a proposition— and 
in the case of deliberation, a moral proposition— also believes that 
it is the case. Th is is not to deny that beliefs can vary in degree (in 
that we believe certain things more strongly or surely than we do 
others). Th is is not a diffi  cult concept for students to grasp. Th ey 
understand that they do not intentionally hold beliefs that they see 
as false.
Th e second tenet of folk epistemology provides that “to hold 
that p is true is generally to hold that the best reasons support p” (p. 
87). To put it another way, our folk epistemology says that our 
beliefs are reason- responsive. Because this is folk epistemology, it 
does not dictate what the best reasons for a belief should be. It 
simply states that we would consider it odd for someone to say, “I 
believe p even though I have better reasons for thinking x is truer 
than p.”
Th is is an important idea for students to grasp as part of 
deliberative civics education. Even if the reason underlying a 
student’s moral belief is that his parents said so or that she read a 
celebrity’s opinion on the issue, that student should recognize that 
these are reasons for belief (however nascent or refutable these 
reasons may be). Similarly, students can recognize from folk episte-
mology that some reasons supersede others and that they them-
selves adjust their beliefs when confronted with more persuasive 
reasons. Even young students recognize that they have reasons to 
believe certain people more than others and that some reasons are 
more persuasive than others. All of this does not dictate, however, 
the framework that a student uses to determine what makes one 
reason more persuasive than another.
Th is is the beginning of the students’ development of a 
framework for understanding the reasons for their own beliefs and 
what is morally persuasive within their moral framework. As 
students develop an understanding of the reasons underlying their 
own beliefs regarding controversial issues, they also learn how to 
share those beliefs with others. Th rough their examination of their 
own beliefs, they come to understand that people can hold a variety 
of moral beliefs and that they are all underpinned by some set of 
reasons. Th is provides a foundation for developing deliberative 
dispositions.
One key deliberative disposition is listening to others. If 
students gain an understanding of folk epistemology, they will have 
motivation to listen to others’ reasons for beliefs. Th is is because 
students who understand folk epistemology understand that their 
own beliefs are subject to change when challenged by good enough 
reasons. If they desire to believe those things that have the best 
reasons, if they understand why they believe what they do on a 
particular issue, and if they acknowledge that new reasons can 
change their beliefs, they should have a willingness to listen to the 
reasons others have for their beliefs.
In the same way, students will develop the disposition to share 
their beliefs and the reasons underpinning those beliefs with 
others. Th ey see themselves as holding reasoned beliefs and 
believing that they have the potential to infl uence others, who also 
hold reason- responsive beliefs. Th is is important because it 
provides clarity of the guidelines that civics teachers follow for 
these types of activities in their classrooms.
Consider for example the Colorado Academic Standards for 
Social Studies (Colorado Department of Education, 2009). Listed 
among the competencies for high school students is the following:
Decision making involves researching an issue, listening to multiple 
perspectives, and weighing potential consequences of alternative 
actions. For example, citizens study the issues before voting. (p. 97)
What does it mean to listen to multiple perspectives? If listening 
means more than being exposed to an aural stimulus, in what ways 
should the students engage with these multiple perspectives? What 
role should students’ own perspectives play in this process? Should 
students be the source of (at least some of) the multiple perspectives?
A deliberative democratic lens provides insight into these 
questions. Listening to multiple perspectives is not done for mere 
exposure, but because students understand that others have 
reasoned beliefs that may infl uence their own reason- responsive 
beliefs. Students understand their own framework for weighing the 
reasons provided by others, and this provides a way for students to 
engage with what they hear from these other perspectives. Th ey 
understand their own perspectives in a way that allows them to 
determine whether what they are hearing requires them to adjust 
their own beliefs. Also, because teachers recognize that students 
hold reasoned positions (though with varying quality of reason), 
teachers can see students as the source of at least some of the 
perspectives that should be present in the classroom.
Th is process of identifying one’s own reasons for holding a 
position on an issue together with sharing that position with and 
listening to others can contribute to the development and expan-
sion of public reason. Deliberation becomes a common framework 
for reasoning. Rawls (1997) and Gutmann and Th ompson (1996) 
each conceive of public reason as providing boundaries around 
what ideas can be brought to a deliberation. Citizens present their 
rationales for positions on moral issues in terms that are acceptable 
to all. Conversely, arguments based on reasons that are not 
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accessible to all citizens, such as those stemming from religious 
convictions, are excluded. Using public reason to draw boundaries 
around deliberation in schools has been criticized, rightly, in our 
view, for placing too great a restriction on deliberation and for 
favoring the reasons of the majority (Kunzman, 2006). By having 
students share their reasons with others during the education stage, 
and by using the framework above to understand the process, we 
see a path to expanded public reason. Students would be encour-
aged to share their own reasons for holding a belief without the 
restriction that it be considered generally acceptable by all. As 
students engage in this process, their frameworks for evaluating 
reasons are shaped by one another, with the potential that the 
concept of public reason itself would not remain static and outside 
of the deliberative process but instead also be shaped by the sharing 
of reasons.
We recognize that asking students to share their reasons for 
holding certain beliefs entails more risk for some students than for 
others. Like all deliberative spaces, classrooms are likely to be safer 
for some students than others. Young (1996) illustrated this in her 
critique of deliberative democracy when she notes that certain 
forms of discourse, such as storytelling and greeting, may not be 
considered acceptable in certain environments. Students who are 
not familiar with the more accepted forms of discourse may not feel 
safe or competent to share their views. However, if safe public 
spaces for deliberation are ever likely to come into existence, this 
change will begin with the civics classroom. It is there that people 
have the opportunity to create and experience a safety that allows 
everyone to share beliefs.4 Equally important, it is a place where 
students can be challenged to consider others’ reasons and thereby 
expand their own reasoning. If teachers succeed in creating safe 
spaces, they also provide spaces for potentially impactful views that 
would otherwise go unexpressed. Reluctance to share beliefs may 
be justifi ed, and this should be recognized, but this underscores the 
importance of the context within which deliberation occurs and its 
fairness and inclusivity.
Similarly, asking students to share their reasons and in turn 
consider other people’s reasons may be seen as threatening to 
certain ways of life. Parents might resist their children being 
exposed to (and asked to consider seriously) the beliefs of others 
and the reasons behind those beliefs. Th is is perhaps nowhere more 
clearly illustrated than in the case of Mozert v. Hawkins County 
Board of Education (1987). In this case, parents asked to have their 
children exempted from the school’s reading curriculum, which 
was selected to meet the mandates of Tennessee to teach the values 
and virtues of citizenship, because the curriculum exposed 
students to ideas that were contrary to the parents’ religious beliefs. 
We can easily imagine that if parents are threatened by their 
children being exposed to other ideas in readings, they would 
strenuously object to having their students engage in deliberation 
about the values and ideas in the readings. We also easily fi nd those 
parents’ objections misguided.
If the parents’ objections are based on the idea that values 
should be shaped by institutions other than school, such as the 
family and religion, the objection does not hold. Schools and the 
civics education that occurs within them cannot be value neutral. 
Although a civics education based on aggregative democracy may 
claim to be value neutral, a network of values undergirds it. As 
discussed earlier, interpretations of autonomy, which are value 
laden, lie at the core of the purportedly value- neutral curriculum. 
For example, aggregative democracy interprets the value of 
equality as the equal opportunity to participate in the aggregative 
democratic process through voting, regardless of how meaningful 
the choices are. Deliberative democracy would argue that such an 
interpretation of equality is meaningless without considering the 
context and process that led to the choices presented to the voter.
If the parents believe that the only values that should be 
present in schools are those that are noncontroversial or that are 
universally shared, they again are in an untenable position. It is 
diffi  cult to identify a set of universal values or virtues that have any 
depth. We grant that there is a high probability that everyone would 
agree on the importance of values like freedom and equality or 
virtues such as patience— so long as their meanings remain vague. 
As soon as people interpret these concepts or apply them, they 
become controversial. Freedom has limits, but where should the 
limits be drawn? Are there situations where people should willingly 
restrict their own freedom for the benefi t of others? Does equality 
require treating all people equally such that we should not prohibit 
a fi ve- year- old from driving? If a fi ve- year- old should not drive, 
what are valid grounds for treating people diff erently? At what 
point does patience become a vice because it has turned into 
neglect or inaction? Th ese questions illustrate how even values that 
are shared are likely shared only in a thin sense and not in a way 
that is meaningful to civics education.
Th e inability to purge education, and particularly civics 
education, of moral content makes it reasonable to expect students 
to share their opinions and to listen to others’ opinions. Th e 
alternative is to do away with common education and instead have 
parents educate or choose an education that aligns with their moral 
beliefs. However, even the most insular groups have some amount 
of diversity in beliefs. We grant that this minimal diversity may be 
less objectionable to parents, but keeping moral controversy out of 
civics education thrusts us back to aggregative democracy, in which 
moral views are not seen as subject to reason.
In the philosophical form of aggregative democracy, the 
position one holds on a particular controversial issue and why such 
a position is held is not the concern of the democratic process. It 
could be acknowledged that controversial issues exist, but asking 
students to examine and revise their own perspectives as part of 
civics education would not be of key importance. Because the 
ability to determine and pursue one’s own conception of the good 
life is an individual right that exists independently from the 
functioning of democracy, civics education need not bring these 
controversial issues into the classroom except insofar as knowledge 
of alternative conceptions of the good life might contribute to 
students’ autonomy.
In the nonphilosophical form of aggregative democracy, 
which views democracy as largely a strategic enterprise, less 
attention is paid to the questions of why one holds certain positions 
and more to how to ensure that a person’s interests are protected 
within the civic arena. Th e emphasis is on such things as debating, 
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coalition building, and strategic maneuvering, not on opening 
one’s beliefs (preferences) up for critical scrutiny. Consider again 
the excerpt from the Colorado Academic Standards for Social 
Studies (Colorado Department of Education, 2009):
Decision making involves researching an issue, listening to multiple 
perspectives, and weighing potential consequences of alternative 
actions. For example, citizens study the issues before voting.
Interpreting this from the perspective of aggregative democracy 
yields a diff erent outcome than does examination from the 
perspective of deliberative democracy. Th e research a student 
performs and the rationale for listening to multiple perspectives 
shift  to a more self- interested perspective. Students may research 
issues solely for the purpose of buttressing their own arguments, 
not considering that other perspectives may be legitimately held. 
Students might listen to multiple perspectives in order to form the 
strategy to best discredit those other perspectives. While this is 
somewhat of a caricature of the aggregative position, it does 
meaningfully refl ect what can happen when the democratic 
process is viewed not as a forum where people’s perspectives are 
shaped through interactions with one another but rather as a place 
where one’s only role is that of advocate for one’s own perceived 
best interests.
Similarly, the aggregative view of democracy does not 
concern itself with the development of public reason. People have 
the right to believe what they will and little concern need be paid in 
the democratic process to developing commonalities or to having 
one’s critical thinking process challenged. Citizens’ perspectives 
can remain private, and people need not concern themselves with 
the rationales behind positions except, again, as a strategic matter.5
Developing Deliberative Character
Th e epistemic premise of democracy points to the development of 
deliberative skills. In this section, we look to the moral premise of 
democracy and consider how the connection between deliberative 
democracy, civics education, and autonomy in the classroom leads 
to understanding deliberative character. Amy Gutmann is a 
leading deliberative theorist who has probably done more to 
ground education in democracy than any philosopher but Dewey 
(in whose tradition she locates her project). Gutmann (1999) 
identifi ed two general features that are constitutive of democratic 
character— the kind of character suited to deliberative 
democracy— both of which are necessary and neither of which is 
suffi  cient alone: character and moral reasoning. Character refers to 
dispositions and habits acquired through inculcation, and moral 
reasoning refers to logical and interpretive skills. Gutmann wrote:
Deliberative citizens are committed, at least partly through the 
inculcation of habit, of living up to the routine demands of democratic 
life, at the same time they are committed to questioning those demands 
whenever they appear to threaten the foundational ideals of 
democratic sovereignty, such as respect for persons. Th e willingness and 
ability to deliberate set morally serious people apart from sophists, who 
use clever argument to elevate their own interests into self- righteous 
causes, and traditionalists, who invoke established authority to 
subordinate their own reason to unjust causes. (1999, p. 52)
Gutmann is quite explicit that her conception of democratic 
character is not morally neutral toward autonomy.6 Here she diff ers 
from other philosophers critical of deliberative democracy’s 
implications for civics education, who hold that teaching children 
to be autonomous has no place in public schools (e.g., Galston, 
1989) or that it does but should be facilitated (children should be 
taught the requisite skills to exercise if they choose) rather than 
promoted (children should not be expected or required to embrace 
autonomy or think autonomously) (e.g., Brighouse, 2000). We are 
in fundamental disagreement with the view that teaching children 
to be autonomous has no place in the public schools, and we fi nd 
the idea of facilitating but not promoting autonomy incoherent. 
Autonomy is associated with habits of mind that must be devel-
oped and practiced over time. It would require very stilted 
conversations, indeed, if teachers went through the motions of 
asking for and giving reasons but remained noncommittal as to the 
value of such an undertaking.
Th ere are two core ideas that anchor the connection between 
civics education and autonomy. Deliberative democracy does not 
keep the idea of autonomy external to the democratic process but 
rather makes it internal by requiring that the autonomy of others be 
given important consideration. As a result, civics education needs to 
demand of its students mutual respect as part of deliberative 
character. Civics education must also attend to the conditions under 
which all can exercise autonomy. Th erefore, students are called upon 
to examine the degree to which all have the opportunity to partici-
pate in the democratic process. Th is involves not only examining the 
conditions surrounding deliberation but also examining the 
democratic process as it exists from within and identifying ways in 
which it permits or constrains people’s autonomy.
If the civics education classroom is to teach mutual respect, 
we must fi rst identify what that includes. On this, we fi nd it helpful 
to consider Gutmann and Th ompson’s (1996) concept of reciproc-
ity. A key component of reciprocity is that people recognize the 
moral status of others in a deliberation (and in politics). Th is 
means that students must learn to view others in deliberation as 
engaging in a legitimate exchange of moral viewpoints rather than 
as expressing a “purely strategic, economic or political view” 
(p. 86). Similarly, students must learn themselves that such 
behavior is not acceptable as part of the deliberative process.
At fi rst glance, this appears naive. Th e real world of politics fi ts 
much better with the aggregative conception than with the 
deliberative conception of democracy. In civics education, 
shouldn’t students learn how to function in the political world as it 
really works? Th e answer to this is yes and no. Civics education 
provides a unique opportunity not only to learn about the political 
process but also to examine it through the lens of mutual respect 
and autonomy. Deliberative democracy is, aft er all, a normative 
political theory, developed in large part as an alternative to 
aggregative democracy, and one that is much more faithful to the 
ideal of democracy.
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As students go through the process of identifying their own 
beliefs and exchanging positions with others, they will also have the 
opportunity to learn that the way such exchanges are structured can 
impact the end results of deliberative process. Sunstein (2000) has 
shown that a deliberative group of people with compatible mindsets 
is likely to become more extreme in its positions as a result of 
deliberation. He illustrates how the composition of deliberative 
groups can impact the impact of deliberations on participants. 
Power can clearly impact the deliberative process (Shapiro, 1999). 
Th e deliberative process is not immune from strategic behavior 
(Simon, 1999). Th ese are legitimate criticisms of deliberation, but 
they are also criticisms that can be addressed, at least in part, by 
thinking about civics education through a deliberative lens.
By engaging in a deliberation in the civics classroom, students 
can learn to evaluate various democratic processes, including 
deliberation itself, to determine whether the process respects their 
own autonomy and the autonomy of others. By starting education 
about deliberation with the formulation of one’s own opinion and 
sharing these opinions with others, deliberative education estab-
lishes a norm for political discussion (if not the entire political 
process) that respects each person’s autonomy by providing space 
for each person to share his own perspectives. As deliberation 
progresses to analysis and criticism of the various perspectives in 
the class, students can refl ect on the degree to which the delibera-
tion respected their own autonomy as well as the autonomy of 
others who shared their perspectives with the class.
Again, this may seem highly improbable, but the deliberative 
process in the civics classroom can be structured so that such 
thinking is encouraged. Students can be prepared to evaluate and 
criticize other perspectives through a process that encourages 
mutual respect. Aft er engaging in deliberation, students can be 
asked to consider what it was about the other viewpoints that made 
them persuasive or unpersuasive. Th ey can compare the reasons 
given by others for their positions to their own and determine the 
degree to which their viewpoint should change in response to these 
other reasons. Additionally, students should consider what other 
information they need from the students to properly evaluate the 
reasons given. Th is type of preparation can provide groundwork for 
deliberation that encourages the mutual respect that is required for 
deliberation.
Students can also learn to become self- evaluators of the 
deliberative process that they engage in. Th ey can learn that it is 
appropriate to ask whether everyone had the opportunity to 
participate. Th ey can learn to ask whether there were viewpoints 
that were not included in the deliberation that should be consid-
ered. Th ey can continue to evaluate their own framework for 
critical thinking by asking why they found certain things more 
persuasive than others and why that was the case.
Again, teachers of civics cannot ignore the realities of our 
political system as it exists. Deliberative democracy allows students 
to see how the current democratic arrangement operates and then 
evaluate how well the system respects people’s autonomy and their 
ability to participate within the system. Th rough the lens of 
autonomy and deliberative democracy, students can examine both 
the process and the context of our current democratic system.
Consider the typical civics education lesson of how a bill 
becomes a law. Students learn about how a bill is introduced and the 
path through the legislative bodies to the executive’s desk. As they 
do so, the deliberative concern with autonomy would encourage 
them to ask why particular bills are introduced at all. In other words, 
whose perspectives are included in the bill that is introduced? Th ey 
can examine legislative hearings and determine to what people or 
groups of people the legislators are listening in this process. Th ey 
can consider whether hearings refl ect an important part of the 
process or whether legislators’ views are chiefl y shaped by other 
means. Th ey can wonder if legislative hearings and fl oor debates 
refl ect the deliberative process or if they refl ect strategic behavior on 
the part of participants. Th ese are not new questions in civics 
education, but students’ deliberative experiences allow them to 
question the degree to which these processes refl ect mutual respect.
In addition to examining the democratic process, students can 
also examine the social context within which this democratic 
process occurs in order to understand why they do or do not 
respect autonomy. Gutmann and Th ompson (1996) argued that 
there are certain minimum social conditions that are required for a 
person’s participation in deliberative democracy. Th ese include 
minimum standards for basic needs such as housing and health 
care. Society is responsible for ensuring that these minimum 
standards are met in order for the democratic process to maintain 
its legitimacy. Th ese minimum standards are not immutable but are 
themselves subject to the deliberative process. Th erefore, students 
would engage questions such as those posed by Brady, Verba, and 
Schlozman (1995) concerning the ways that resource distribution 
aff ects various types of political activities.
As an example, consider the issue of how campaigns work in 
the current democratic system. As part of this process, students 
might examine the issue of campaign fi nance regulations and the 
case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the 
Supreme Court case that declared restrictions on independent 
campaign expenditures by corporations and unions unconstitu-
tional. Under a discussion or debate that occurs without the 
deliberative democratic lens, students could formulate a variety of 
opinions concerning the outcome of the case. Some might agree 
with the outcome, because they value freedom and argue that 
restricting corporations from spending money is a restriction of 
freedom. Along those lines, they would argue that this value should 
trump other concerns about access to the political process, perhaps 
suggesting that there are a variety of ways for individuals and 
organizations to infl uence the political process and that singling 
out independent expenditures of money unfairly burdens those 
who happen to have that resource. Others may argue that the case 
was decided wrongly, those students view money as a particularly 
infl uential resource and value equality of participation above 
freedom to spend money to express political views.
Th e deliberative democratic lens would change the nature of 
the deliberation by asking students to explicitly consider two 
factors for each reason argued. Th e fi rst would ask the students to 
think about the idea of mutual respect and seeing one another as 
reasonable. With respect to participating in politics, students 
would have to consider what processes entities such as 
democracy & education, vol 19, no- 2  feature article 8
corporations and unions go through in forming their political 
opinions. While these can vary, students can compare the possible 
processes to their own process of opinion formation and evalua-
tion. Does folk epistemology hold true for these entities in such a 
way that the political opinions expressed by them should be 
aff orded the same assumption of reasonableness and mutual 
respect that we give fellow citizens? As students consider questions 
such as this, they would engage in a reasoning process, driven by 
deliberative ideals, that allows them to form their own answer.
Th e second factor would ask the students to consider this 
question through the lens of access and opportunity. Students 
would ask in what ways the results of this decision might skew 
what voices are heard in the democratic process. If certain voices 
might be pushed to the margins, what is the appropriate response? 
Does it require that a diff erent decision be reached? Are there other 
ways to address the issue that would respect the value of freedom 
and protect autonomy? If people determine that messages from 
these entities should be discounted in certain instances, is that 
enough to dilute such a group’s voice and provide disincentive for 
money to be spent in independent political expenditures? Th ese 
questions would not necessarily arise in discussions absent a 
framework of deliberative democracy.
Aggregative democracy does not have the same concerns 
about autonomy and would not require the same type of civic 
education outlined above. Aggregative democracy need only 
concern itself with the strategic activity of others. Gutmann and 
Th ompson (1996) illustrated two approaches that civics education 
infl uenced by aggregative democracy could take. On the one hand, 
students might learn how to best advocate for their own positions 
through the use of strategy. Th is would refl ect the idea of 
prudence— that many political disagreements are best resolved 
through bargaining and, like aggregative democracy itself, 
students should be concerned most with the procedures surround-
ing the bargaining process. We agree with Gutmann and 
Th ompson that bargaining cannot substitute for moral reasoning, 
because it does not refl ect what citizens owe one another as 
autonomous yet interdependent members of society.
Alternatively, students could be taught impartiality as an 
alternative to deliberation and that would be part of an education 
in the aggregative democracy tradition. Students would fi nd moral 
claims to support their positions that are acceptable from an 
impersonal perspective (Gutmann & Th ompson, 1996). But this 
also fails to show mutual respect for fellow citizens because it 
denies the epistemic premise of democracy— that there is a 
diversity of reasonable beliefs. Students in this tradition would be 
taught to demonstrate the moral truth of their claims, thereby 
denying that people may have diff erent frameworks for evaluating 
the content of moral claims. Th is perspective stifl es public dis-
course because, aft er having demonstrated the moral truth of a 
claim, citizens will label those who disagree with this demonstra-
tion of the truth as unreasonable.
Conclusion
As conversations about civics education continue, the theory of 
democracy that underlies civics education deserves attention. We 
have shown how deliberative democracy attends better to the 
moral and epistemic premises of democracy and how viewing 
civics education through the lens of deliberative democracy 
provides new insights into civics education. Th e classroom 
practices, content standards, and school board policies discussed 
in this paper are the beginnings of what we believe to be an 
important discussion in civics education.
If deliberative democracy is to impact civics education in a 
meaningful way, there are many issues yet to be explored. More 
consideration must be given to how to balance teaching for the 
aspirational goals of a more deliberative democracy and the 
realities of our current democratic system. Scholars such as Walter 
Parker (2006) have done much to advance thinking about discus-
sion in the civics classroom, but we believe that it would be fruitful 
to consider how an explicitly deliberative democratic theoretical 
perspective can add to the purposes and pedagogy related to 
discussion in the classroom. Th ere are also questions related to 
how to prepare teachers to engage students in deliberation, 
particularly when they themselves may not have engaged in 
deliberation in their own school learning experiences. We invite 
others to consider whether deliberative democracy should be 
considered as a guide for civics instruction and, if it should, to 
explore these and other implications for civics education.
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Notes
1. Th e general liberal framework has been challenged, of course, 
from various directions: postmodernist, critical, and communitar-
ian. Although we believe the conception of civics education we 
advance here can accommodate or fend off  these challenges, that is 
an argument for another place.
 2. In this paper, we focus on civics education, meaning courses 
such as government and civics classes that are explicitly designed to 
prepare students to participate in political life. Th e illustrations in 
the paper are those that would be found in a civics class. Th is is 
done solely for clarity and to focus the scope of the paper. We 
believe deliberative democratic theory should be considered with 
respect to civics education in general, and should permeate how the 
entire educational experience prepares students for political life. 
Th e principles of deliberative democracy can be modeled through 
classroom norms and school governance. It should also be a 
consideration in general education classes as deliberation can 
occur across subject areas.
 3. Th e curriculum is guided by the Colorado Academic Standards 
for Social Studies. Although those standards make no explicit 
mention of controversial issues, students are expected to “research, 
formulate positions, and engage in appropriate civic participation 
to address local, state, and national issues or policies.” (Colorado 
Department of Education, 2009, p. 17)
4. Training teachers to create deliberative spaces in the classroom is 
a formidable challenge and a discussion of the challenge is beyond 
the scope of this paper. See Stitzlein (2010) for a discussion of 
current work in this area.
5. For example, in aggregative democracy, a person need not 
genuinely believe in or understand an evidentiary basis for 
supply- side economics in order to assert that basis in the political 
arena to win assent to the policy of tax cuts for the wealthy.
6. Gutmann defi nes moral autonomy in a more specifi c and limited 
way than we might autonomy, and she rejects it as a necessary 
ingredient of democratic citizenship. In particular, Gutmann 
defi nes moral autonomy as “the desire and capacity to make moral 
choices based on principles generalizable among all persons” 
(1999, p. 59).
